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Possible World Semantics
for First Order LP∗
Melvin Fitting
September 20, 2011
Abstract
In [1] an elegant formulation of the first-order logic of proofs was given, FOLP. That report
also proved an arithmetic completeness theorem, and a realization theorem for the logic. In this
report we provide a possible-world semantics for FOLP, based on the propositional semantics of
[2]. Motivation and intuition for the logic itself can be found in [1], and are not discussed here.
We also give an Mkrtychev semantics for FOLP. This report was essentially completed June 10,
2011.
1 The Language and the Axioms
This is directly from a technical report of Artemov and Yavorskaya, [1]. The language definition is
not repeated here, but the axiomatization is, for reference purposes.
A1 classical axioms of first order logic
A2 t:XyA→ t:XA, y /∈ FVar(A)
A3 t:X → t:XyA
B1 t:XA→ A
B2 s:X(A→ B)→ (t:X → (s · t):XA)
B3 t:XA→ (t+ s):XA, s:XA→ (t+ s):XA
B4 t:XA→!t:Xt:XA
B5 t:XA→ genx(t):X∀xA, x /∈ X
R1 ` A,A→ B ⇒ ` B
R2 ` A ⇒ ` ∀xA
R3 ` c:A, where A is an axiom, c is a proof constant
∗This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. 0830450.
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2 Models
A possible world model for FOLP is a structure M = 〈G,R,D, I, E〉, where the various items are
as follows.
G A non-empty set, of possible worlds or states.
R An accessibility relation on G—a binary relation that is reflexive and transitive.
D A domain function on G—mapping G to non-empty domains, subject to the monotonicity con-
dition that Γ,∆ ∈ G and ΓR∆ imply D(Γ) ⊆ D(∆).
1. We call ∪{D(Γ) | Γ ∈ G} the domain of the model M.
2. A valuation in M is a mapping v from individual variables to the domain of the model
M.
3. A valuation lives in possible world Γ provided, for each individual variable x, v(x) ∈
D(Γ).
I An interpretation function—for each n-place relation symbol R and each Γ ∈ G, I(R,Γ) is an
n-place relation on the domain of the model M.
E An evidence function—for each justification term t, each formula A, each finite setX of individual
variables, and each valuation v, E(t, A,X, v) is a set of possible worlds in which v lives.
The idea behind the evidence function is this. If Γ ∈ E(t, A,X, v), then informally Γ is a possible
world in which t serves as relevant evidence for the formula A, where the members of X are treated
as parameters whose values are supplied by v.
Special conditions are imposed on evidence functions. Most come from LP; three are new to
FOLP.
· Condition E(s,A→ B,X, v) ∩ E(t, A,X, v) ⊆ E((s · t), B,X, v).
+ Condition E(s,A,X, v) ∪ E(t, A,X, v) ⊆ E((s+ t), A,X, v).
R Closure Condition ΓR∆ and Γ ∈ E(t, A,X, v) imply ∆ ∈ E(t, A,X, v).
! Condition E(t, A,X, v) ⊆ E(!t, t:XA,X, v).
Contraction Condition E(t, A,Xy, v) ⊆ E(t, A,X, v) provided y /∈ FVar(A).
Expansion Condition E(t, A,X, v) ⊆ E(t, A,Xy, v)
genx Condition E(t, A,X, v) ⊆ E(genx(t), ∀xA,X, v) provided x /∈ X.
Truth of formulas at worlds of modelM = 〈G,R,D,A, I〉, with respect to a valuation v, denoted
M,Γ v X, is evaluated as follows.
1. M,Γ v R(x1, . . . , xn)⇐⇒ 〈v(x1), . . . , v(xn)〉 ∈ I(Γ, R) for R an n-place relation symbol;
2. M,Γ 6v ⊥;
3. M,Γ v A → B ⇐⇒ M,Γ 6v A or M,Γ v B, and similarly for other propositional
connectives;
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4. M,Γ v ∀xA⇐⇒M,Γ w A for every x-variant w of v such that w(x) ∈ D(Γ).
5. M,Γ v t:XA⇐⇒
(a) Γ ∈ E(t, A,X, v) and
(b) M,∆ w A for every ∆ ∈ G such that ΓR∆, and for every valuation w that lives in ∆
and agrees with v on the variables in X.
We say A is valid in the modelM = 〈G,R,D,A, I〉 if, for every Γ ∈ G, and for every valuation
v that lives in Γ, M,Γ v A.
A model meets constant specification C provided, if c:∅A ∈ C then for each Γ ∈ G and for each
valuation v that lives in Γ, Γ ∈ E(c, A, ∅, v).
3 Soundness
Each of the FOLP axioms is valid in all models, and the rules preserve validity, hence each theorem
is valid. We show this for a few of the axioms, and omit details for the rest. In what follows,
assume M = 〈G,R,D,A, I〉 is an FOLP model.
A2 Validity Suppose Γ ∈ G and v is a valuation that lives in Γ. Suppose also thatM,Γ v t:XyA,
where y /∈ FVar(A). We show M,Γ v t:XA.
Since M,Γ v t:XyA then Γ ∈ E(t, A,Xy, v), and so Γ ∈ E(t, A,X, v) by the Contraction
Condition.
Let ∆ ∈ G be such that ΓR∆, and let w be a valuation that lives in ∆ and agrees with v
on the variables in X; we show M,∆ w A, which is enough to conclude this case. Let w′
be like w except that w′(y) = v(y). Then v and w′ agree on the variables in Xy. Also since
the domain function is monotonic, it follows that w′ lives in ∆. Since M,Γ v t:XyA, then
M,∆ w′ A. Finally, since w and w′ differ only on y and this does not occur free in A,
M,∆ w A.
A3 Validity Suppose Γ ∈ G, v is a valuation that lives in Γ, and M,Γ v t :XA. We show
M,Γ v t:XyA.
Since M,Γ v t :XA then Γ ∈ E(t, A,X, v), and so Γ ∈ E(t, A,Xy, v) by the Expansion
Condition.
Let ∆ ∈ G be such that ΓR∆, and let w be a valuation that lives in ∆ and agrees with v on
the variables in Xy; we must showM,∆ w A. But since v and w agree on variables in Xy,
in particular they agree on variables in X. Then since M,Γ v t:XA, it follows by definition
that M,∆ w A.
B5 Validity Suppose Γ ∈ G, v is a valuation that lives in Γ, x /∈ X, and M,Γ v t:XA. We show
M,Γ v genx(t):X∀xA.
SinceM,Γ v t:XA then Γ ∈ E(t, A,X, v), so Γ ∈ E(genx(t),∀xA,X, v) by the genx Condition.
Let ∆ ∈ G be such that ΓR∆, and let w be a valuation that lives in ∆ and agrees with v on
the variables in X; we show M,∆ w ∀xA. For this, let w′ be an arbitrary x-variant of w,
with w′(x) ∈ D(∆); we will show that M,∆ w′ A. But v and w′ agree on the variables of
X, since x /∈ X. Also w′ lives in ∆. Then since M,Γ v t:XA, it follows that M,∆ w′ A,
which is what was wanted.
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The other axioms are valid, and the rules preserve validity—results left to the reader. It follows
that the axiom system is sound with respect to the semantics. This allows for taking constant
specifications into account.
4 Constant Specifications
We will be constructing a ‘canonical’ model, and showing it establishes a basic completeness result.
Subsequently we discuss what else it does. While soundness holds with respect to any constant
specification, completeness requires something more. The first is familiar from propositional LP.
Definition 4.1 A constant specification C is axiomatically appropriate if, for every axiom A there
is a proof constant c such that c:∅A ∈ C.
An internalization theorem can be proved for FOLP provided an axiomatically appropriate
constant specification is assumed—see [1].
The completeness proof will use a Henkin construction, so the original language will need to
be extended by the addition of ‘witnesses’. Presumably a constant specification is for the original
language, so we will need a way of extending it usefully to the larger language. The following
requirement makes it straightforward to do that—other ways may be possible, but this will do for
now.
Definition 4.2 Two formulas, A and B of FOLP are variable variants of each other if the following
conditions are met:
1. the free variables of A are x1, . . . , xn, and the free variables of B are y1, . . . , yn,
2. the substitution of yi for xi is free in A, for all i = 1, . . . , n, and turns A into B,
3. the substitution of xi for yi is free in B, for all i = 1, . . . , n, and turns B into A.
Informally, A and B are variable variants if they are identical except for the choice of free variables.
In other words, A = ϕ(x1, . . . , xn), and B = ϕ(y1, . . . , yn) for some ϕ.
Definition 4.3 A constant specification C is variant closed provided that whenever A and B are
variable variants, c:∅A ∈ C if and only if c:∅B ∈ C.
Our completeness proof will assume constant specifications are axiomatically appropriate and
variant closed. Note that a schematic constant specification is trivially variant closed.
5 Language Extensions
Throughout the rest of this note L is the language of FOLP, with a fixed set of individual variables.
It is for formulas of L that completeness will be proved, but we need to extend the language,
Henkin-style, for purposes of proving completeness. Let P be some set of individual variables
not used in L—following one tradition we call these variables parameters. By L(P) we mean the
language formulated like L, but also allowing variables from P, parameters, but with the proviso
that parameters are never quantified. Parameters are intended to serve as witnesses for existential
statements. The condition that parameters are never bound means that if p is a parameter, (∀p)
and genp may not appear in formulas of L(P). In particular, the rule of universal generalization can
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only be applied to a formula ϕ(x) if x is an individual variable that is not a parameter. This gives
rise to some minor complications, which are addressed later in the section. The reason for requiring
that parameters are never bound is simply that it allows us to avoid problems when substituting
parameters for free variable occurrences—such substitutions are automatically free.
Axiom schemes of FOLP are still as specified in Section 1, but the language L(P) may be used
instead of L. We will say which we are using, as appropriate. Next we discuss extending constant
specifications from L to L(P).
Definition 5.1 Let C be a variant closed constant specification for the language L. We define a
constant specification C(P) for L(P) as follows. Let ϕ(p1, . . . , pn) be a formula of L(P) with p1,
. . . , pn as parameters. Let x1, . . . , xn be individual variables that are not parameters, and that do
not occur in ϕ(p1, . . . , pn), free or bound. If c:∅ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ C, put c:∅ϕ(p1, . . . , pn) ∈ C(P).
Some observations. First, since C is variant closed, the actual choice of free variables x1, . . . ,
xn doesn’t matter. Second, if ϕ has no parameter occurrences then substitution for parameters
doesn’t change anything, and it follows that C(P) extends C. It is easy to see that it does so
conservatively. Third, it is easy to check that C(P) is also variant closed. And finally, since FOLP
is axiomatized using axiom schemes, it is easy to see that if C is axiomatically appropriate with
respect to L, then C(P) will be axiomatically appropriate with respect to L(P). It follows that the
Internalization Theorem still applies, and with the same proof. We omit the verification. Note that
since parameters are not quantified, if universal generalization is applied to ψ(x) in the course of a
proof of ϕ, a non-parameter x must be involved, and so genx is available to be used in a justification
term.
Finally we consider the important issue of universal generalization and parameters. If ϕ(x)
is provable for an individual variable x that is not a parameter, the universal generalization rule
tells us we can conclude (∀x)ϕ(x). But if ϕ(p) is provable where p is a parameter, we cannot
conclude that (∀p)ϕ(p) is provable, since parameters cannot occur bound. Proposition 5.3 provides
a substitute for this.
Proposition 5.2 Assume the following.
1. C is a constant specification that is variant closed,
2. L(P) extends L with countably many parameters, and C(P) is the extension of C to L(P),
3. Z1, Z2, . . . , Zn is an FOLP proof in the language L(P), using constant specification C(P),
4. p is a parameter, and x is an individual variable that is not a parameter, but that does not
occur in Z1, Z2, . . . , Zn free or bound,
5. Z ′1, Z ′2, . . . , Z ′n is the sequence that results from Z1, Z2, . . . , Zn by replacing all occurrences
of p with occurrences of x.
Then Z ′1, Z ′2, . . . , Z ′n is also an FOLP proof.
Proof The proof is by induction on proof length.
If Z is an axiom of FOLP, so is Z ′, since FOLP axiomatization is by schemes.
If Z follows from X and X ⊃ Z by modus ponens, then Z ′ similarly follows from X ′ and
(X ⊃ Z)′ = (X ′ ⊃ Z ′).
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If (∀z)ϕ(z) follows from ϕ(z) using universal generalization, since z occurs bound in the proof
then z is not the parameter p. Then [(∀z)ϕ(z)]′ = (∀z)[ϕ(z)′] follows from ϕ(z)′, also by universal
generalization.
Finally, suppose c:∅X is by Axiom Necessitation, and so c:∅X ∈ C(P). Then [c:∅X]′ = c:∅[X ′]
also follows by Axiom Necessitation, using the fact that C(P) is variant closed.
Now we can prove that we have the effect of universal generalization applied to parameters,
even though parameters themselves can not be quantified.
Proposition 5.3 Let C be a variant closed constant specification for the language L, and let C(P)
be its extension to L(P). Let ϕ(p) be a formula of L(P), where p is a parameter. If ϕ(p) is provable
using constant specification C(P), so is (∀x)ϕ(x), where x is any individual variable of L that is
free for p in ϕ(p).
Proof Let z be an individual variable that is not a parameter, and that does not occur in the proof
of ϕ(p). Using Proposition 5.2, ϕ(z) is also provable. Then (∀z)ϕ(z) is provable using universal
generalization. Further, (∀z)ϕ(z) ⊃ (∀x)ϕ(x) is classically valid, hence (∀x)ϕ(x) is provable. (The
need for this last step is because the variable x might have occured in the proof of ϕ(p).)
6 Completeness
For this section P is a countable set of parameters, not occurring as individual variables in the
language L. The usual Henkin/Lindenbaum construction can be applied, and one can prove the
following (details omitted, though Proposition 5.3 comes in). Let W1 ⊆ P be a set of parameters,
possibly empty, and let F be a consistent set of formulas in the language L(W1). Assume W2 ⊆ P
extends W1 with countably many additional parameters. Then F extends to a set F ′ that is
maximally consistent and E-complete in the language L(W2), with parameters as witnesses. (that
is, every existential or negated universal quantifier has a parameter witness.)
The following model construction assumes a constant specification C for L that is variant closed
and axiomatically appropriate. Parameters play a fundamental role in creating the model, but
finally it is only formulas from the original language L that we are concerned with—formulas
without parameters. We now specify the canonical model M = 〈G,R,D, I, E〉.
Special Notation Let W ⊆ P be a set of parameters.
1. L(W ) is the set of formulas whose individual variables are those of L and also members of
W , with the proviso that parameters from W are not bound (essentially, this is as before).
2. L∗(W ) is the subset of L(W ) consisting of those formulas all of whose free variables are
parameters.
3. Let S be a set of formulas of L∗(W ). Then S] is the set of formulas A such that t:XA ∈ S,
for some justification term t and some set X of parameters.
Definition of G Call Γ = 〈form(Γ), parm(Γ)〉 an HL-world (standing for Henkin/Lindenbaum) if:
1. parm(Γ) is a countable set of parameters (that is, a countable subset of P) that also
omits countably many parameters.
2. form(Γ) is a set of formulas in the language L∗(parm(Γ)).
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3. form(Γ) is consistent, maximally so among sets of formulas in the language L∗(parm(Γ)),
and E-complete. Note that the definition of consistency brings constant specification C
into things.
We let G be the collection of all HL-worlds.
Definition of R For Γ = 〈form(Γ), parm(Γ)〉 and ∆ = 〈form(∆), parm(∆)〉, set ΓR∆ provided:
1. parm(Γ) ⊆ parm(∆)
2. (form(Γ))] ⊆ form(∆)
Definition of D For Γ ∈ G where Γ = 〈form(Γ), parm(Γ)〉, set D(Γ) = parm(Γ).
Definition of I For an n-place relation symbol R and for Γ ∈ G, let I(R,Γ) be the set of all
〈p1, . . . , pn〉 where each pi is a parameter, and R(p1, . . . , pn) ∈ form(Γ).
Valuations A valuation v maps individual variables of the language L to the domain of the model
(which happens to be the set of parameters). Then a valuation v induces a substitution,
which we call σv, on formulas of L: replace each free occurrence of individual variable x
with parameter v(x). If A is a formula of L, Aσv is a formula whose free variables are all
parameters. Note that since formulas of L cannot have quantifiers that bind parameters, σv
is automatically a free substitution on formulas in L.
Definition of E Let A be a formula of L and let X be a set of variables of L. Set Γ ∈ E(t, A,X, v)
provided v lives in Γ and [t:XA]σv ∈ form(Γ).
A remark about the substitution σv associated with a valuation v. Suppose A is a formula of
L that is provable in FOLP, and v is a valuation in the canonical model just defined. Then Aσv is
a formula in the language L(P), and it is also provable in FOLP. There is more than one argument
for this—here is a simple one. Say A = ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) where x1, . . . , xn are the free variables
of A, none of which are parameters. Since ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) is provable, by universal generalization
so is (∀x1) · · · (∀xn)ϕ(x1, . . . , xn). The formula (∀x1) · · · (∀xn)ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) ⊃ ϕ(x1σv, . . . , xnσv) of
L(P) is provable, hence so is ϕ(x1σv, . . . , xnσv) = Aσv.
We have finished the definition of the canonical modelM = 〈G,R,D, I, E〉. It must be checked
that it is a model with respect to the language L. Most of this is straightforward—we consider
only the R Closure Condition as an example. Suppose Γ,∆ ∈ G and ΓR∆. Suppose also that Γ ∈
E(t, A,X, v), where A is a formula of L and X is a set of variables of L. We show ∆ ∈ E(t, A,X, v).
By definition of E , v lives in Γ and [t:XA]σv ∈ form(Γ). Axiom B4 tells us t:XA ⊃!t:Xt:XA is an
axiom, and so by the remarks above, [t:XA ⊃!t:Xt:XA]σv is provable, that is, [t:XA]σv ⊃ [!t:Xt:XA]σv.
It follows that [!t:Xt:XA]σv ∈ form(Γ), or equivalently, !t:Xσv [t:XA]σv ∈ form(Γ). Then by definition
of R, [t:XA]σv ∈ form(∆). Also v lives in ∆ since v lives in Γ and parm(Γ) ⊆ parm(∆). But then
∆ ∈ E(t, A,X, v).
Now the expected main result.
Theorem 6.1 (Truth Lemma) For each formula A in the language L, for each Γ ∈ G, and for
each valuation v that lives in Γ,
M,Γ v A⇐⇒ Aσv ∈ form(Γ).
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Proof The proof is by induction on formula degree. Much of this is familiar, so we only give two
cases. In both, we assume v is a valuation that lives in Γ.
Justification Formulas Assume that t:XA is a formula in the language L and the Truth Lemma is
known for A. One direction is very simple, just as it is propositionally.
Suppose [t:XA]σv /∈ form(Γ). Then Γ /∈ E(t, A,X, v) by definition of E , and so M,Γ 6v t:XA.
Next suppose [t:XA]σv ∈ form(Γ). By definition of E , Γ ∈ E(t, A,X, v). Further, let ∆ ∈ G
with ΓR∆, and let w be a valuation that lives in ∆ and agrees with v on members of X; we
showM,∆ w A. A is a formula of L so its free variables are not parameters, and hence can be
bound. Say the free variables of A that are not inX are ~y. By repeated use of axiom B5 we can
produce a justification term u so that t:XA→ u:X∀~yA is provable. Since [t:XA]σv ∈ form(Γ)
then [u:X∀~yA]σv ∈ form(Γ). That is, u:Xσv [∀~yA]σv ∈ form(Γ). Since (form(Γ))] ⊆ form(∆)
then [∀~yA]σv ∈ form(∆). Now repeated use of the universal instantiation axiom establishes
that Aσw ∈ form(∆), so by the induction hypothesis, M,∆ w A. We now have enough to
conclude M,Γ v t:XA.
Quantified Formulas Assume that (∀x)A(x) is a formula in the language L and the Truth Lemma
is known for A(x).
Suppose first that [(∀x)A(x)]σv ∈ form(Γ). Let w be an arbitrary x-variant of v such that
w(x) ∈ D(Γ), say w(x) = p where p ∈ parm(Γ). Now (∀x)A(x) ⊃ A(p) is a provable formula
of L(P), so [(∀x)A(x) ⊃ A(p)]σv is also provable, but this is [(∀x)A(x)]σv ⊃ [A(x)]σw, hence
[A(x)]σw ∈ form(Γ). By the induction hypothesis, M,Γ w A(x). Since w was arbitrary,
M,Γ v (∀x)A(x).
Finally, suppose that [(∀x)A(x)]σv /∈ form(Γ). Since form(Γ) is E-complete, for some pa-
rameter p in parm(Γ), [A(p)]σv /∈ form(Γ). Let w be the x-variant of v where w(x) = p.
Then [A(x)]σw /∈ form(Γ). By the induction hypothesis, M,Γ 6w A(x), and it follows that
M,Γ 6v (∀x)A(x).
Completeness now follows in the usual way. Since every formula is equi-provable with its
universal closure, and also equi-valid with it, it is enough to prove completeness for closed formulas,
so suppose closed formula A of L is not provable. Then {¬A} is consistent. Let V ⊆ P contain
countably many parameters, while also omitting countably many parameters. Extend {¬A} to
a set M that is maximally consistent and E-complete with respect to the language L∗(V ), with
parameters serving as witnesses. Let Γ = 〈M,V 〉. This is a possible world in the canonical model,
and A will be false at it under any valuation that lives in Γ; the choice of valuation doesn’t matter
since A has no free variables.
7 Mkrtychev Models
For propositional LP, Mkrtychev models were the original non-arithmetic semantics. They carry
over to FOLP in a direct way.
Definition 7.1 An Mkrtychev FOLP model is a structure, M = 〈〈D, I〉, E〉 where 〈D, I〉 is a
classical first-order model, and E is an evidence function. In detail, these are as follows.
D A non-empty set, the domain of the model.
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I An interpretation, assigning to each n-place relation symbol of language L some n-ary relation
on D.
E An evidence function, mapping justification term t, formula A of L, finite set X of individual
variables, and valuation v in D, to a boolean truth value, E(t, A,X, v). An evidence function
must meet the following conditions.
· Condition E(s,A→ B,X, v) ∧ E(t, A,X, v)→ E((s · t), B,X, v).
+ Condition E(s,A,X, v) ∨ E(t, A,X, v)→ E((s+ t), A,X, v).
! Condition E(t, A,X, v)→ E(!t, t:XA,X, v).
Contraction Condition E(t, A,Xy, v)→ E(t, A,X, v) provided y /∈ FVar(A).
Expansion Condition E(t, A,X, v)→ E(t, A,Xy, v)
genx Condition E(t, A,X, v)→ E(genx(t), ∀xA,X, v) provided x /∈ X.
We write M v A to symbolize that formula A of language L is true in Mkrtychev model M
under valuation v in D. The truth conditions are as follows.
Atomic For an n place relation symbol R, M v R(x1, . . . , xn)⇐⇒ 〈v(x1), . . . , v(xn)〉 ∈ RI .
Propositional M v (X → Y )⇐⇒M 6v X or M v Y , and similarly for other connectives.
Quantifier M v ∀xA⇐⇒M w A for every valuation w in D that is an x variant of v.
Justification Term M v t:XA ⇐⇒ E(t, A,X, v) and M w A for every valuation w in D that
agrees with v on the members of X.
It is straightforward to check that Mkrtychev models are, essentially, one-world FOLP models,
and so we have soundness with respect to them. It is also straightforward to check that each
possible world in the canonical model is an Mkrtychev model, and completeness with respect to
such models follows.
8 Fully Explanatory Models
Definition 8.1 A model M = 〈G,R,D,A, I〉 is fully explanatory if it meets the following condi-
tion. For each Γ ∈ G, for each valuation v that lives in Γ, and for each formula A of language L
with X being the set of its free variables, if M,∆ v A for every ∆ ∈ G such that ΓR∆, then
M,Γ v t:XA for some justification term t.
Theorem 8.2 The canonical model is fully explanatory.
Proof Let M = 〈G,R,D,A, I〉 be the canonical model. Let Γ ∈ G, and let v be a valuation that
lives in Γ. Suppose A is a formula in the language L, with X as the set of its free variables, and
M,Γ 6v t:XA for every justification term t. We show that for some ∆ ∈ G with ΓR∆,M,∆ 6v A.
To keep notation simple, let A′ = Aσv and let X ′ be Xσv. Then for each t, [t :XA]σv =
t:Xσv(Aσv) = t:X′A′. By our assumption and the Truth Lemma, [t:XA]σv /∈ form(Γ) for every
justification term t, that is, t :X′A′ /∈ form(Γ). Using this we first show (form(Γ))] ∪ {¬A′} is
consistent.
Well, suppose not, that is, suppose (form(Γ))]∪{¬A′} is inconsistent. We derive a contradiction.
Assuming the inconsistency, there are B1, . . . , Bn ∈ (form(Γ))] so that ` B1 → B2 → . . .→ Bn →
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A′, where association is to the right. By Internalization, ` w:∅(B1 → B2 → . . . → Bn → A′), for
some justification term w. Also for each i, since Bi ∈ (form(Γ))] then ui:XiBi ∈ Γ for some ui, and
Xi.
Let Z = X1 ∪X2 ∪ . . . ∪Xn ∪X ′. Using axiom A3 repeatedly we get ` w:Z(B1 → B2 → . . .→
Bn → A′). Also, repeated use of A3 gives us ` ui:XiBi → ui:ZBi, for each i, and since form(Γ) is
maximally consistent, ui:ZBi ∈ form(Γ) for each i.
Now, using axiom B2, each of the following is provable (association is to the left in the justifi-
cation terms).
w:Z(B1 → B2 → . . .→ Bn → A′)
u1:ZB1 →(w · u1):Z(B2 → . . .→ Bn → A′)
u1:ZB1 → u2:ZB2 →(w · u1 · u2):Z(B3 → . . .→ Bn → A′)
...
u1:ZB1 → u2:ZB2 → . . .→ un:ZBn →(w · u1 · u2 · . . . · un):ZA′
For each i, ui:ZBi ∈ form(Γ). It follows that (w · u1 · u2 · . . . · un):ZA′ ∈ form(Γ). Then repeated
use of axiom A2 gives us that (w · u1 · u2 · . . . · un):X′A′ ∈ form(Γ), contradicting the fact that
t:X′A′ /∈ form(Γ) for every justification term t.
We have now shown that (form(Γ))] ∪ {¬A′} is consistent. Let parm(∆) extend parm(Γ) with
the addition of a countable set of parameters, so that countably many parameters are still omitted.
Extend the consistent set (form(Γ))] ∪ {¬A′} to a set form(∆) that is maximally consistent and E-
complete with respect to L∗(∆), with parameters as witnesses. Then ∆ = 〈form(∆), parm(∆)〉 ∈ G
and ΓR∆. Since ¬A′ ∈ form(∆), that is ¬Aσv ∈ form(∆), by the Truth LemmaM,∆ 6v A, which
completes the proof.
Corollary 8.3 FOLP is complete with respect to the class of fully explanatory models.
The definition of fully explanatory involves formulas of the form t:XA where X is the set of free
variables of A. The following allows a broader range for X.
Theorem 8.4 Assume the following:
1. M = 〈G,R,D,A, I〉 is a fully explanatory model,
2. Γ ∈ G and v is a valuation that lives in Γ,
3. A is a formula of L,
4. X is a set of variables of L (not necessarily the set of free variables of A),
5. for each ∆ ∈ G with ΓR∆, and for each valuation w that lives in ∆ and agrees with v on the
members of X, M,∆ w A.
Then for some justification term t, M,Γ v t:XA.
Proof Let X0 be the set of free variables of A that are in X, and let y1, . . . , yn be the free variables
of A that are not in X.
Let ∆ be an arbitrary member of G with ΓR∆, and let w be a valuation that lives in ∆ and
agrees with v on X. Let w′ be any yn variant of w that lives in ∆. Then w′ also agrees with v on
members of X so by item 5, M,∆ w′ A. Since w′ was arbitrary, we have M,∆ w ∀ynA.
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We have shown thatM,∆ w ∀ynA for every w that lives in ∆ and agrees with v on the members
of X; this is item 5 but for ∀ynA instead of for A. Then the argument can be repeated with this
formula, to show thatM,∆ w ∀yn−1∀ynA, and so on. Finally we get thatM,∆ w ∀y1 · · · ∀ynA,
for every w that lives in ∆ and agrees with v on members of X. As a special case we can take
w = v, and so M,∆ v ∀y1 · · · ∀ynA.
The set of free variables of ∀y1 · · · ∀ynA is exactly X0 and since ∆ was arbitrary, by the definition
of fully explanatory M,Γ v t :X0∀y1 · · · ∀ynA, for some justification term t. It is a theorem of
classical logic, and hence of FOLP, that ∀y1 · · · ∀ynA→ A so by Internalization, u:∅(∀y1 · · · ∀ynA→
A) is provable for some justification term u, and hence also u:X0(∀y1 · · · ∀ynA → A), by repeated
use of axiom A3. Then using axiom B2, t:X0∀y1 · · · ∀ynA → (u · t):X0A is provable. By repeated
use of axiom A3, t:X0∀y1 · · · ∀ynA→ (u · t):XA is also provable. It follows that M,Γ v (u · t):XA,
which concludes the proof.
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